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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
AccREurloN-TITLE To NEW

LAND--ENCROACHMENT

OV WATERCOURSE UPON

LANDS BEYOND.-D's lands were bounded on the east by a river and on the
west by the land of P. By erosion the river slowly shifted until all of D's
tract was washed away as well as part of P's holding. The river then slowly
receded and the land of P was built up as was also new land east of the
former boundary of P and D. P brings an action to quiet title for the land
newly formed. Held, title to the land in dispute rested in P. Yearsley v.
Gipple, (Nebr., igig) 175 N. W. 641.
D, though accepting the general principal of accretion, contended that
the doctrine did not apply to lands the boundary of which is fixed and definite as in the case of property not originally riparian. This contention is not
without authority. Volcanic Oil and Gas Co. v. Chaplin, 27 Ont. L. Rep. 34;
Allard v. Curran, I68 N. W. 761; Gilbert v. Eldridge, 47 Minn. 2IO; Ocean
City Ass'n. v. Shriver, 64 N. J. L. 55o. This view however has been denied
in the following cases: Welles v. Bailey, 55 Conn. 292; Peuker v. Canter,
62 Kan. 363; Widdecomb v. Chiles, 173 Mo. 195. The principal case follows
the latter authorities and refuses to distinguish the case where the boundary
is a fixed line and from its very nature is unshiftable. Under this view land
entirely landlocked may acquire the privileges and liabilities of riparian
land by means of the action of the forces of nature. See 17 MIcH. L. Rv.
95; see also 26 HARv. L. Rzv. i85.
ADoPTIoN-DESCZNT

AND DISTRsUTION

IN RELAPION

TO AN ADOPTED

CHILD.-An intestate left surviving him two sons of his deceased sister and

an adopted son of his deceased brother. The adopted son claimed, by right
of representation, one-half of the estate as heir of the intestate under § 3964,
WYOMING COMPILED STATUTES, which provides, that an adopted child "* * *
shall be entitled to the same rights of person and property as children or
heirs at law of the persons thus adopting them, unless the rights of property
should be excepted in the agreement of adoption." Held, that the adopted
son was entitled to one-half of the estate. In re Cadwell's Estate, (Wyo.,
1920), 186 Pac. 499.
Adoption was unknown to the common law, and hence, the legal status
of an adopted child is determined entirely by statute. Albring v. Ward, 137
Mich. 352; PECK, DOMESTIc RELATIONS, § io6. The statutes generally provide
that the adopted child may inherit from the adopting parents. Morrison v.
Sessions, 70 Mich. 297; STI SON, Am. ST. LAW, § 6647A. Although his right
to inherit from his natural kindred is not thereby destroyed. In re Darling's
Estate, 173 Cal. 221; 15 MICH. L. Rgv. i61. Since all the rights in favor of
the adopted child exist solely by statute, it has generally been held, in the
absence of special provision in the statute, that the adopted child cannot inherit from the kindred of the adopting parent. Wallace v. Noland, 246 Ill.
535, 545; In re Leask, i97 N. Y. 193. In accord with this view, and contrary
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to the decision in the principal case, it has been held that the adopted child
will not take by descent from a brother of his deceased adopting parent. Van
Derlyn v. Mack, 137 Mich. 146; Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456. Nor from
the father of such parent. Quigley v. Mitchell, 41 Ohio St. 375. Nor, the
mother of such parent. Meader v. Archer, 65 N. H. 214; H/erritt v. Morton,
143 Ky. 133. Nor from the grandson of the.adopting parent. Helm's Adm'r.

v. Elliott, 89 Tenn. 446.

The decision in the principal case, therefore; must

depend solely upon some decisive distinction between the statute upon which

it rests and the statutes of other states-especially in the absence of a special
provision for inheritance from kindred.

As to the devolution of the estate

of an adopted child, it is universally held that the estate will descend to his
issue. In default of issue, some states give the estate to the natural kindred
of the adopted child. Reinders v. Kopplenmo, 68 Mo. 482; Baker v. Clowser,
158 Ia. 156. But the better view seems to be that the estate should go to the
adopting parents or their kindred. Paul v. Davis, ioo Ind. 422; Estate of
Jobson, 164 Cal. 312. It has been held that the issue of an adopted child may
inherit direct from the adopting parents by representation. Pace v. Klink,
51 Ga. 22o. But see, contra, In re Sunderland's Estate, 6o Ia. 732. As to the
effect of a subsequent adoption destroying all rights of inheritance under a
prior adoption, see, In re Klapp's Estate, 197 Mich. 615, 16 MIcH. L. REv. 120.
ANIMALS-RIGHT To KILL DOG-RELATIVE VALUE

ov

DoG AND PROPERTY

ATTACKED.-In an action for killing of P's dog, D justified on the ground
that he was protecting his own valuable guinea hens. Held, it was a question
for the jury whether the act of D was a reasonable one under the circumstances. -They might consider the relative values of the dog and the guinea
hens, but they should not consider "valuable qualities in the trespassing dog,
whether of pedigree of training, not apparent to the observation of a man of
ordinary intelligence and not ordinarily inherent in dogs of a similar appearance." Ex parte Minor, (Ala., 1919) 83 So. 475.
A dog was not the subject of larceny at early common law, the reason
assigned being its base nature. 3 Coxg, LiTT, p. 295. Although this view
would seem to negative the existence of a legal property in canines, courts
have uniformly allowed proof of a dog's value in civil cases. Bowers v.
Horen, 93 Mich. 42o, (shepherd dog); Uhlein v. Croinack, log Mass. 273,
(watch dog); Brill v. Flagler, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 354, (well-trained setter
dog). But a dog's general "character" for value may be impeached by showing that he is a sheep killer. Dunlap v. Snyder, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 561. Where
a dog is negligently killed, his pedigree may be given in proof of value.
Citizens' Rapid Transit Co. v. Dew, ioo Tenn. 317. The court said, at p.
326, "* * * this particular dog killed is said to have had what, in dog circles,
is regarded as 'blue blood,' and among these he belongs to the inner circle of
the four hundred, a member of the F. F. T., or first families of Tennessee."
But courts do not always consider the fact that the dog may be much more
valuable than the property to be protected. Leonard v. Wilkins, 9 Johns (N.
Y.) 233; Simmonds v. Holmes, 61 Conn. i. It is said that a dog may be
destroyed under any circumstances when it is absolutely necessary for the
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preservation of property.

INrHAm, THX LAW OF ANIMALS, p. 128. While a
dog may not lawfully be killed for mere trespassing, (Marshall v. Blackshire,
44 Iowa 475) yet a man is justified in shooting into a congregation of dogs
on his premises at night, if they are creating such a disturbance as to make
the shooting a reasonable and necessary means of abating the nuisance. Hubbard v. Preston, 90 Mich. 221. Where the relative value of the dog and the
property attacked is considered at all, it is a question for the jury to determine. Anderson v. Smith, 7 Ill.
App. 354, (Irish setter pups killing blooded
hen). It is submitted that the test established in the principal case is sound,
-i. e., the proportionate value apparent or known to the person killing the
dog rather than the actual value of the animals. See notes 40 L. R. A. 51o;
19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 836; L. R. A., 1915 C 359; 8 Cor. L. Rzv. 147; 24 YALn
L. J. 170.
BANxRUPTCY-PRxFZR=Ncz-FouR MONTHS PIRWOD.-A transaction by
which a corporation, more than four months prior to its bankruptcy, made a
verbal and later a confirmatory written assignment of stock in other corporations as security for a loan, held, not to constitute a voidable preference,
though the certificates of stock were delivered within four months of the
bankruptcy. Wiener v. Union Trust Co., (D. C. E. D. Mich., S. D., Dec.,
1919), 261 Fed. 7o9.
This case exemplifies the principle of the bankruptcy law which emerges
with gratifying consistency from much more complicated problems of fact
and interrelated law. A setting aside of securities as collateral amounted
to a lien on such securities preferable to the claim of the trustee in bankruptcy, notwithstanding lienor retained possession. Sexton v. Kessler &
Co., 225 U. S. go. Delivery of securities carried by a broker, to a customer,
after the broker's insolvency is not necessarily a preference. Richardson v.
Shaw, 2o9 U. S. 365. A legal lien on shares of stock bought by a broker and
retained by him on behalf of a customer, will endure even after the trustee
takes over the estate, Gorman v. Littlefield, 229 U. S. i9. But where there is
no specific res to identify the fund and separate it from the estate, there may
be no lien, and hence even under the agreement between the parties a voidable preference will follow, Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N. Y., 231 U. S.
5o; an equitable lien to validate a preference must relate to some specific property or thing capable of segregation or identification, In re Imperial Textile
Co., 255 Fed. i99, In re Mandel, 127 Fed. 863, In re Sheridan, 98 Fed. 4o6.
However, if the transaction merely renders specific a pre-existing general
lien, it is a valid preference, Gage Lumber Co. v. McEldowney, 207 Fd. 255;
and where the goods never would have come into the bankrupt's hands, had
he not promised to give a lien thereon, accepted in good faith, the lien endures against all rights no greater. Greey v. Dockendorrf, 231 U. S. 513,
Cr. Re Imp. Textile Co., supra. This array of cases reveals the test of the
character of a preference: Is or is not the estate of the bankrupt during the
prescribed period depleted by it? If a legal or equitable lien attaches
to property in his hands before the four months' period, it carries
through. "No creditor can demand that the estate be augmented by the
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wrongful conversion of property of another, or the application to the general
estate of property which does not belong or never has belonged to the bankrupt."

Gorman v. Littlefield, 229 U. S. 19, 25.

BUILDING IZSTRIcTIoN-A DUPLEX, OR TWO-FAMILY RESIDENCE AS A
"FIRST-CLASS PRIVATE RESIDENcr.--The grantee covenanted that for a certain

period "no building or structure other than a first-class private residence shall
be erected, placed, or permitted on said premises." The grantee erected a
"duplex" building to house two families but it was occupied by one only up
to time of trial. Held: The building "as now used and occupied" constitutes
a strictly first-class private residence as to outward appearances and the
departure from the terms of the covenant as to the interior may be remedied

by enjoining its use to one family.

Walker v. Haslet et al., (Cal., 1920), 186

Pac. 622.
Covenants

use

of

restriction

of

though

not

favored

will

be

en-

forced. The intent of the parties as determined from the language of
the covenant construed strictly will govern. In Levy v. Schreyer, 177 N.
Y. 293, the covenant against any house except private dwellings was
held not violated by an erection of a three-story flat building but is use by
more than one family was enjoined as in the principal case. However, generally, when the plural is used the covenant is not held violated by a structure
housing more than one family. See cases cited in 45 L. R. A. (N.S.) 729.
In the principal case the court took the words of the covenant to describe the
use rather than the structure. Where the words are private residence or
private dwelling there appears to be little conflict of opinion. But where the
covenant calls for no building other than a dwelling house or a residence
building the authorities are not in accord. In Schadt v. Brill, 173 Mich. 647,
and in Misch v. Lehman, 178 Mich. 225, the restriction that "no building other
than a dwelling house shall be erected on a lot" was held to warrant an injunction against a flat building and a double house with one entrance, the
court construing the intention to be a single dwelling for one family on each
lot and not merely one dwelling house for more than one family. Accord,
see Haris v. Roraback, 137 Mich. 292; Kingston v. Busch, 176 Mich. 566;
Bagnall v. Young, 151 Mich. 69; Powers v. Radding, 225 Mass. iIo; II MIcH.
L. Rrv. 521. In these cases the connoted meaning of the words is included
rather than the bare meaning denoted and to this extent they do not follow
the rule of strict construction against the covenant which itself is based on
the disfavor of covenants of restriction. The more recent cases incline to the
rule of strict construction. See Mainnett v. Born, 247 Pa. 418; Johnson v.
Joies, 244 Pa. 386, 52 L. R. A. (N.S.) 325; Hutchinson v. Ulrich, 145 IIl.
336; Anoff v. Williams, 94 Ohio St. 145; Reformed Church v. Building Co.,
214 N. Y. 268; L. R. A. I 9 15-F 651. In a late case in the Supreme Court of
Missouri, Bolin v. Tyrol Inv. Co., 273 Mo. 257 (917), in which all the above
cases were cited, the rule of strict construction was adopted, contrary to the
former holdings in that state in Thompson v. Langan, 172 Mo. App. 64, and
in Sanders v. Dixon, 114 Mo. App. 229, and it was held a covenant excluditng
the erection of more than "one dwelling house" of not less than two stories in
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height, being in derogation of the fee, could not be extended by implication
and an apartment building being a dwelling house was not excluded by the
covenant.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-EQUAL

PROTECTION

OF THE LAWS-RFILLING

OF

BOTTLES PROTECTED By TRADE-MARI.-The defendant was prosecuted under
a Florida statute forbidding the refilling of milk bottles, etc., having a registered trade mark 'blown in.' The purchaser from the owner of the trademark was excepted from the operation of the law. Held, the statute was invalid as contrary to the Florida and Federal constitutions: This inhibited
refillment was an unjust and unreasonable discrimination in favor of a class
of people who own a very common and ordinary kind of personal property.
Yeager v. State, (Fla., 1920) 83 So. 525.
There seems to be a decided split in authority on the question of the
validity of statutes similar to the one in the principal case. Following the
decision of People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32, the courts of Cal., Ky., Mass., and
R. I., have held such statutes constitutional; while, upon the reasoning of the
leading case of Lippman v. People, 175 Ill. ioI, the courts of Ind., Mo., and
Ohio have come to the opposite conclusion. Although the authorities are
perhaps irreconcilable, yet there are certain variations in the wording of the
different statutes on which the courts lay great emphasis. In two of the
statutes declared invalid, bottlers of milk, cream, etc., were not included in
the operation of the law. Lippman v. People, supra; State v. BaskowitZ, 250
Mo. 82. In the latter case this exclusion was regarded as sufficient to negative the claim that the act was a proper exercise of the police power, and to
distinguish the statute from that in the Cannon case, supra. Statutes not referring to food products, but merely to containers generally, have been held
invalid as not intended primarily for the protection of the public. Horcich v.
Walker-Gordon Lab. Co., 205 Ill. 497; State v. Wiggail, (Ind., 1918) 118 N.
E. 684. Statutes which have been upheld have uniformly contained an express reference to food products. Bartolotti v. Police Court, 35 Cal. App. 372;
Comm. v. Goldberg, 167 Ky. 96; Comm. v. Anselvitch, I86 Mass. 376; People
v. Cannon, supra; People v. Luhrs, 195 N. Y. 377; State v. Hand Brewing
Co., 32 R. I. 56. It was said by the court in the Anselvitch case, supra, at
P. 378, that the statute "* * * makes provisions in reference to a kind of property used in a peculiar way, which is of such a nature as to call for peculiar
provisions for the protection of the public and its owners against the fraud
of evildoers." Another variation in wording is emphasized in the case of
State v. Schmuck, 77 Ohio St. 438. The court, in holding invalid a 'milk
bottle' statute, pointed out that in the New York statute the purchaser from
the owner of the trade-mark was excepted from the penalty of the law, while
the Ohio act made no such exception and so deprived the purchaser of the
right of acquiring property. The statute in the principal case (FLA. GEN.
STAT. i9o6, par. 3345), being identical with the New York statute in the
two particulars above emphasized, the decision would hardly seem to be supported by the line of authorities cited by the court. The contention that such
a statute is bad as class legislation was effectively disposed of by the court in
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Comm. v. Goldberg, supra, the court saying, at p. log: "* * * every act having for its purpose the prevention of fraud and the punishment of persons
who commit fraud necessarily affords protection to the persons who might
be defrauded except for the statute." See also note to State v. Baskowitz,
supra, Ann. Cas. I915-A, 487.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw--PRIvILXG4S AND 11MMUNITIES-NPXV YORK INcoms
TAx.-The New York income tax law (Chap. 627, Laws igig) provided for
deduction at the source of salaries of non-residents in every case where the
salary was more than $i,ooo per annum. An exemption of $i,ooo or, more
was allowed to every resident. A non-resident was allowed *only an exemption based on the amount of income tax he paid in his own state, and then
only in case such state allowed similar exemptions for residents of New
York. Held, the act was invalid under the 'privileges and immunities' clause
of the Federal Constitution. Under the known circumstances that citizens
of Connecticut and New Jersey (states having no income tax laws), would be
allowed no exemptions, this was an unwarranted discrimination against the
citizens of those states. Travias v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., (March I, 192o)

Sup. Ct. Rep. -.
A state is given great latitude in the manner of collecting taxes from
non-residents, (see Shaffer v. Carter, infra), but there must not be an unreasonable difference in the manner of assessment as between resident and
non-resident. Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. (inheritance tax). An act
giving resident creditors priority over non-resident creditors violates the
'privileges and immunities' clause. Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239. So
also does a statute placing a higher license tax on non-residents than on
residents. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430, the court stating that one
of the privileges and immunities protected is the right "* * * to be exempt
from any higher taxes or excises than are imposed by the state on its own
citizens." Although this question has been side-stepped by one court, (State
v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456), yet the decision in the principal case would seem
unassailable, once it be admitted that the inequality between residents is
neither accidental nor merely occasional. Maxwell v. Bugbee, supra; Amoskeag Savings Bank v. Purdy, 231 U. S. 373.
-

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--STAT- INcoMig TAx-POwER TO TAX INcofn OP
statute of Oklahoma laid a tax on the total income of
residents from whatever source derived, and taxed that part of the income of
non-residents which was derived from property situated within the state.
Unpaid taxes were to become a lien on the property of the taxpayer. The
exemptions for married persons, etc., were the same for non-residents as for
residents. The plaintiff, a non-resident whose income from oil lands within
the state was $1,500,000 yearly, claimed that the imposition of the tax was in
violation of the 'due process' and 'equal protection' clauses of the Federal
Constitution. Held, the act was a valid exercise of the state's taxing powers.
The fact that a citizen of one state has a right to hold property or carry
on an occupation or business in another state is a very reasonable ground for
NoN-ItEsinNT.-A
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subjecting such non-resident, to the extent of his business carried on therein, to a duty to pay taxes not more onerous in effect than those imposed upon
citizens of the latter state. Shaffer v. Carter, (March I, 1920), - Sup. Ct.
Rep. -.
This decision settles a much discussed question. BLACK ON INCOMX
TAxEs, sec. 15. Where the question of residence is not involved, income is
taxable itrespective of its connection with interstate commerce. U. S. Glue
Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321. The fact that the creditor is a non-resident
does not prevent the taxation of credits in the hands of a resident agent,
(New Orleans v. Stenpel, 175 U. S. 309), nor the taxation of bonds and
mortgages within the taxing state. Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S.
133. But the operation of a state tax law must be limited to persons, property, and business within its jurisdiction. State-tax on Foreign-Held Bonds,
i5 Wall. 3oo. The fact that such a tax as the one in the principal case
amounts to double taxation of property within the state does not make it
invalid. St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350. Such classifications
as are not arbitrary and unreasonable may be made by a state for taxing
purposes. M. C. R. Co. v. Powers, 2oi U. S. 245. The fact that different
methods are provided for collection from one class than from another does
not affect the validity of the law. Peacock v. Pratt, 121 Fed. 772; Travis v.
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., (U. S., 1920) supra. But, outside of mere methods
of collection, a state income tax, to be valid, must bear equally on residents
and non-residents. Travis case, supra. See also note L. R. A. 1915-B 569.
DFDS-CONDITION

IN

RPSTRAINT or ALIENATION-INVALID, AS REPLGNANT

'To INTREST CRXAXD.-Plaintiff conveyed the lot in question by a deed which
contained provisions that (i) it should not be sold, leased or rented to any
person other than of the Caucasian race, nor (2) should any person other
than of the Caucasian race be permitted to occupy such property; upon
breach the grantor or his assigns to have the right of re-entry. Such restrictions to terminate on January i, I93o. By mesne conveyances the lot has
come to the defendant, , negro. The plaintiff seeks to declare a forfeiture
of title for breach of the conditions subsequent. Held: These provisions
must be construed as conditions subsequent; the first is void as in restraint
of alienation; the second, being merely a restriction on the use, is valid.
Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, (Cal., i919) I86 Pac. 596.
The court held that the condition against alienation came directly within
Sec. 711, Civ. Code Cal., which is as follows: "conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created, are void;" that an incident of
an estate in fee, which was here purported to be conveyed, is the right of
free disposal and transfer; that this condition is, therefore, void, the Code
leaving no room for a distinction between partial and total restraints. This
court, in substance, affirms the decision in Title Guarantee Co. v. Garrott,
(Cal., igig), 183 Pac. 470, noted and discussed briefly in i8 Micir. L. Rrv.
59. The court in the latter case held, in substance, that any restraint on
alienation is repugnant to the grant of a fee simple, (the condition there
only prohibiting sale to negroes, Chinese or Japanese, and being limited in
time), and, in the case at hand, the same principle seems to be adopted. It
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may be noted, however, that there is a slight variation in the facts of the two
cases, inasmuch as in the present case alienation is only allowed to be made
to a specified class while in the previous case it was allowed to all save
certain specified classes. This is sometimes made a basis of distinction. See
GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OP PROPERTY, § 41; WILLIAMS ON S=fTLMXNTS, 134, 135. While, as a general principle, restraints on the alienation
of an estate in fee are looked upon with disfavor, and certainly any attempt
at a total restraint is void, cases may be found which uphold certain partial
and limited restraints; as, for instance, a restriction against the sale to negroes-Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573; Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724. Some proceed upon the distinction above mentioned,
that is, whether the restraint affects alienation only to a certain class, or to
all but the specified class or classes; others suggest that the period of time
during which the restraint is to be effective should be considered. The cases
are in great conflict, and it seems impossible to deduce therefrom any rule
which may be said to govern all cases. For a discussion of the subject of
segregation ordinances and their validity see 16 MIcH. L. Rtv. I09, though
this is on a different phase of the subject.
EASEMXNTs-PRorITS A PR.NDa -LicENsts-RvociLITY.--Plaintiff corporation was granted (by deed) the right to bottle and sell the surplus waters
from the Saratoga springs on specified terms with the right to enter and
use the reservation for that purpose. In an action to enjoin the defendant
from preventing the plaintiff from entering and enjoying his rights, held,
that the instrument granted an easement, an incorporeal hereditament, an
interest in the land and not a mere revocable license. Saratoga State Waters
Corporation v.. Pratt, (N. Y., i92o) 125 N. E. 834.
If the right granted was an easement it was obviously an easement in
gross since it was unattached to any tenement. In England and in some of
the states of this country the existence of an easement in gross is denied,
and such a right is regarded as no more than a mere license. Ackroyd v.
Smith, io C. B. 164; Boatman v. Lasley, 23 Ohio St. 614. Other courts recognize such an easement and hold it to be assignable and inheritable. Goodrich v. Burbank, 97 Mass. 27; Poull v. Mockley, 33 Wis. 482; New York v.
Law, 125 N. Y. 38o. A profit a prendre is a right to take the soil or the
products of the soil; it is assignable and may be held in gross or as appurtenant to another estate. Grubb v. Grubb, 74 Pa. St. 25; Welcome v. Upton,
6 M. & W. 536. The right to take the waters of a spring is regarded not as
a profit but as an easement. Race v. Ward, 4 El. & BI. 7o2. A very recent
case in Vermont holds such right to be a profit. Clement v. Rutland Country
Club, (192o) io8 Alt. 843. A mere license to do something on the land of
another is revocable at the will of the licensor, but in some states it becomes
irrevocable when executed or when the licensee has incurred expense. Oster
v. Broe, 161 Ind. 113; Rerick v. Kern, 14 S. & R. (Pa.) 267. There is another
class of privileges, not strictly embraced within the term easements, profits
or licenses, which are regarded as assignable and irrevocable. These are
variously called "a great deal more than a license," Standard Oil Co. v.
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Buchli, 72 N. J. Eq. 492 (right to lay oil pipes) ; cf. Davis v. Tway, 16 Ariz. 566;
or "a license coupled with a grant," Penman v. Jones, OO Ati. 1043 (right to
dig and remove coal) ; cf. Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. 475; or "coupled with an
interest," Ingalls v. St. Paid etc. Ry., 39 Minn. 479 (to enter and remove
chattels). For an exhaustive discussion of the confusion in terms and faulty
analysis in easement and license cases see 27 YALE L. Joue. 66. See also 7
CoL. L. REv. 536; 14 MICH. L. REv. 259; 7 MICH. L. RE;v. 6o5; 13 MICH. L.
REv. 401.
EVIDENCE-INTOXICATINo LIQuoRS-ADMISSIBILITY OF UNPROVED NOTE.In a prosecution under the Alabama prohibition law, the state was allowed
to show that officers found the following note on top of some cases of beer
in the possession of the defendant: "Frank, please put this in the lounge
and make Elvira burn the boxes and go to sleep and don't talk. B." The
name of the defendant was Ben. Held, the note was improperly admitted in
evidence, since there was no proof that it was written or authorized by the
defendant. Ex parte Edmunds, (Ala., 1919) 89 So. 93.
The rule followed in the principal case has the approval of text writers
and courts. 3 WIGMORS, EV., § 2130; I GREENLEAF, Ev. [16th ed.], 68o;
Stamper v. Griffin, 2o Ga. 312; Langford v. State, 9 Tex. App. 283; State v.
Grant, 74 Mo. 33. If there had been proof of the handwriting of the note it
would presumably have been admissible. Burton v. State, lO7 Ala. lo8. Such
evidence would, if proved, be admissible irrespective of the method by which
it was obtained. People v. Trine, 164 Mich. I. A distinction is made in the
principal case and elsewhere between papers and other property seized, (State
v. Krinski, 78 Vt. 162), the theory being that the writing without proof of
identity is legally non-existent. Stamper v. Griffin, supra. Courts do not
always observe this distinction. In a recent Alabama case the state was
allowed to prove by parol evidence the contents of an unproved writing similar to the one in the principal case. Johnson v. State, 78 So. 716. It was said
in Sigfried v. Levan, 6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 308, 312, "* * * if there be any fact
or circumstance tending to prove the execution, or from which the execution
might be presumed, then like other presumptive evidence, it is open for the
decision of the jury." It is submitted that a fair construction of the circumstances would make the note a part of the whole transaction and presumptively part of the instructions given by the defendant to his confederate.
GIFTS-ORDMR IN BANK BOOK NOT EVIDENCE op Gsin OF BANK DEPosirNo DELIVERY SHow.-R sold land to H, agreeing to take in part payment
thereof a deposit in a bank, and requested the purchaser to make the account
payable to himself or M or the survivor of either of them. H executed the
order and delivered the book and order to R or to R and M, by placing it on
a table in their presence. M was later seen with the book but shortly afterwards it was returned to R in whose possession it remained until his death.
In an action by R's executors against the bank and the alleged donee, held,
no valid gift inter vivos to M was created since there was neither a sufficient
showing of R's donative intent nor a valid delivery. Rice et at v. The Bennington County Savings Bank et al, (Vt., 1920) lo8 Att. 708.
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To effect a valid gift inter vivos of money on deposit the same elements
are required which are necessary for an effective donation of any other personal property, namely, a donative intent coupled with a valid delivery of
some sort. Dougherty v. Moore, 71 Md. 248; Bailey v. New Bedford Institute, 192 Mass. 56. Delivery of a bank book coupled with the necessary intent
is sufficient. Camp's Appeal, 36 Conn. 88; Hill v. Stevenson, 63 Me. 364.
Where the book has been mislaid, a signed order to pay the amount of the
deposit to the donee, delivered to him, has also been held to constitute a
valid delivery. Candee v. Connecticut Savings Bank, 81 Conn: 372. When,
however, an attempt is made to establish a gift whether neither of these
modes of delivery has been made use of, a conflict arises. The situation in
the principal case was of this sort and the majority holding followed the rule
advocated chiefly by Maryland that the delivery of the pass-book itself or its
equivalent is necessary. Whalen v. Milholland, 89 Md. 199; Colmary v. Fanning, 124 Md. 548; Dougherty v. Moore, supra. Other cases from which the
court purported to derive support are: McCullough v. Forrest, 84 N. J. Eq.
iox; Taylor v. Corriell, 66 N. J. Eq. 262; Schippers v. Kernpkes, 67 Atl. 74;
Denigan v. San Francisco Savings Bank, 127 Cal. 142. All of these are dis.
tinguishable from the principal case and the Maryland cases on the ground
that additional facts were present which tended to negative the donative
intent. The dissenting opinion in the principal case adopted what appears to
be a less technical minority rule that the contractual arrangement with the
bank, whereby the account was made payable to either or the survivor, created
a joint ownership and was of itself a sufficient delivery without a subsequent
manual handing-over of either the book or the order. Dunn v. Houghton,
51 Atl. 71; Dennin v. Hilton, 50 Atl. 6oo; Marston v. The Industrial Trust
Co., 107 Ati. 88; Buckinghan's Appeal, 6o Conn. 143; Erwin v. Felter, 283 IlL
36; Whitehead v. Smith, ig R. I. 135; Blick v. Cockins, 252 Pa. 56; Negaunee Nat'l. Bank v. LeBeau, 195 Mich. 502; Kennedy v. MacMurray, 169 Cal.
287. In most of these cases the donor and donee went to the bank together
and made the arrangement whereby the deposit was put in their joint names.
The intent in the principal case is by no means so clear, but the court foregoes the possibility of making a distinction on this ground and considers
that such an arrangement can at best be nothing but evidence of an intent
and that mere intent is not delivery. The argument which seems to make
the strongest appeal to those adopting the majority view, is that the donor
who retains the bank book may draw out all the funds and thus make the
alleged gifts a nullity. Whalen; v. Milholland, supra. The minority view
counters with the argument that the fact that the donor may indirectly defeat
the gift by withdrawing the account does not of itself show that there was
no valid delivery since the donee also has the power to withdraw the deposit
as joint owner. Raftery v. Reilly, 107 Atl. 711; Industrial rust Co. v. Scanlon, 26 R. I. 228. Clearly, it is not inconsistent with the creation of a joint
ownership that the donor as one of the joint owners should retain the bank
book. Marston v. The Industrial Trust Co., supra. In spite of the logic and
attempted logic advanced by both sides it seems evident that the real conflict
it between an unwillingness to abandon the ancient technical theory of a
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delivery upon the one side, as opposed to the more liberal view that the clear
intention of the parties should not be defeated by technical considerations.
For additional discussion see x2 RULING CASE LAW 946, 2 HAv. L. Riv. 453,
and 15 HARV. L. Ragv. 751.
HIGHWAYS-COASTING TRAveam-In an action for damages for personal
injuries resulting from a collision on a public road between defendant's carriage and a sled upon which plaintiff was coasting for pleasure, it was held
that each party had equal rights as travelers, and that coasting was not such
an act as to amount to a public nuisance, and consequently no bar to recovery,
Roennau v. Whitson, (Ia., I92O), 175 N. W. 849.
In some jurisdictions coasting on city streets is deemed a public nuisance
per se (Wilmingtom v. Vandegrift, I Mary. 5; Reusch v. Licking Rolling Mill
Co., 18 Ky. 369); while a statement to the contrary is found in Jackson v.
Castle, 8o Me. xi.
But even by such courts as the latter it is asserted,
obiter, that under some circumstances coasting coupled with boisterous conduct may constitute a nuisance. Even the principal case does not go so far
as to deny that proposition. Many of the cases on this subject are suits
against municipalities by persons injured by coasters, where the municipality
had, by ordinance, forbidden coasting (Faulkner v. City of Aurora, 85 Ind.
i3o), or where it had expressly given permission for such use (Burford v.
Grand Rapids, 53 Mich. 98), in both cases a recovery being denied. Consciously or unconsciously, the courts are influenced by two considerations,
viz., the means of locomotion and the purpose of the use, in this problem
of determining who is a traveler. For instance, in McCarthy v. Portland.
67 Me. 167, the court says by way of dictum that a boy might be a traveler
if he coasts his way to school, but not if he does so for pastime, but it is
submittted that the fact was there lost sight of that highways are properly
intended and used for purposes of pleasure as well as of business. Where
the injured party's play involved travel over the highway, a recovery was
allowed in Reed v. Madison, 83 Wis. 371, and in Beaudin v. Bay City, 136
Mich. 333; and in Gulline v. Lowell, I44 Mass. 491, we find the same result
even though the injured party was, at the moment of injury, engaged in a
sport not connected with travel. Compare with this last case Blodgett v.
Boston, 8 Allen (Mass.) 237, and Tighe v. Lowell, n9 Mass. 472. On all
fours with the case at hand is Lynch v. Public Service Ry. Co., 82 N. J. L.
712, 42 L. R. A. (N.S.) 865, note. See also the note in 4 Ann. Cas. 248.
MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABmiJTY or OWNR VOR INJURIES TO AN INVITEE

or His CHAumFum-Defendant sent his chauffeur on an errand with his
car. Contrary to instructions the chauffeur invited plaintiff's intestate to ride
with him. The car was overturned and both were killed. In an action to
recover for death of intestate, held, defendant was not liable, as chauffeur
acted outside his authority in inviting deceased to ride. Rolfe v. Hewitt

(N. Y.,

1920),

125

N. E. 8o4.

Some difficulty was experienced in reaching the decision in this case.
The plaintiff recovered in the trial court, and a divided court affirmed the
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decision in the Appellate Division, apparently approving the theory of the
trial court that the deceased was a licensee of the defendant, being in the
car with the chauffeur's permission, and defendant, through his servant, owed
him a duty of ordinary care. Had the view of the trial judge prevailed a
very stringent liability indeed would be fixed on automobile owners who employ chauffeurs. On the general subject of a master's liability for the torts
of his servant, Justice Holmes has said, "It is hard to explain why a master
is liable to the extent that he is for the negligent acts of one who at the time
really is his servant, acting within the general scope of his employment."
Dempsey v. Chambers, 154 Mass. 330. In some cases this liability is extremely severe, as in the case of the carrier, who is liable for assault and
battery by a servant on a passenger even though committed under circumstances wholly unconnected with the discharge of servant's duty. HUTCHINSON, CARMRS, [3d3Ed.] § 1093, and cases there cited. This liability extends
not only to conductors but also to brakemen and porters of sleeping and
drawing-room cars. HUTCHINSON, supra, §§ 1094, io95. The basis of the
liability in these cases can be put on broad considerations of public policy,
but in the present case no such considerations seem to enter. In automobile cases, in order to render the owner liable for the negligence of the driver,
the latter must be his servant or agent and acting within the scope of his
employment at the time the act was committed. This rule has been invoked
mainly where a pedestrian has been injured by negligent driving. That case
is to be distinguished from the principal case in that there the person is
rightfully in the street when injured, while an invitee of the chauffeur is
not rightfully in the owner's car. In the former case, where the driver is
acting for the master at the time of the accident, the employer is liable for
the driver's negligence; as to one rightfully in the road, driver is servant of
the owner. Ann. Cases, 1914-C io87, and numerous cases there cited. Where
the chauffeur is on some errand of his own or is acting contrary to orders at
time of accident, the owner is not liable; driver is not servant of owner,--he
is acting for himself. Colwell v. Aetna Battle and Stopper Co., 33 R. I. 531.
The situation in the principal case is distinguishable from this. The driver
was on an errand for his employer. As to a pedestrian, the driven was, therefore, the owner's servant and owner would be liable for injuries to such
pedestrian. But as to an invitee of the driver, the master-servant relation
did not exist. In driving the car, the chauffeur was acting within the scope
of his employment. In inviting another to ride with him he was acting outside it. As to the invitee the driver was not the servant of the owner, though
he would be as to pedestrians or others lawfully in the highway. See an
interesting case, Powers v. Williamson, i89 Ala. 6oo, where defendant permitted his son to use his car to take three of son's friends for a ride on
condition that he secure one Skeggs to drive the car. The arrangement was
made, and Skeggs invited the plaintiff to join the party. Plaintiff was injurid through negligent driving of Skeggs and sued the owner of the car.
The court denied his liability and stated that if "* * * Skeggs was, as to third
parties, and as to the son and the three young ladies who were his guestsa matter which is not before us-the servant of the father, he was not the
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servant of the father insofar as Miss Powers (the plaintiff) was concerned."
There have been only a few cases involving a suit by an invitee of the
chauffeur, injured through his negligence, though in the realm of horsedrawn vehicles the law is well-settled that the owner is not liable. Driscoll
v. Scanlon, 165 Mass. 348; Scott v. Peabody Coal Co., 153 Ill.
App. 1O3; Schulwitz v. Delta Lumber Co., 126 Mich. 559- See also, decided on the same day
as principal case, Goldberg v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., (N. Y., 192O)
125 N. E. 807. A similar rule has been employed where employees of a common carrier invite a person to ride without paying fare. Such a person is
not entitled to the rights of a passenger. See extended note 37 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 419 and cases there cited. These rules denying master's liability have
been applied in automobile cases with few exceptions, one of which is noted
below. The texts on automobile law lay down the broad rule that a guest of
a driver cannot recover against the owner. THE LAw APPLIiED TO MOTOR
VEHrcLs, BABBrIT, [2d Ed.] § 818; HUDDY ON AUTOMOBILES, [4th Ed.] §
276. Similar statement in Ann. Cases 1917-D IOOI. The decision in the principal case is in accord with this view and is supported by the following decisions in other cases: Walker v. Fuller, 223 Mass. 566; Gruber v. Cater
Transfer Co., 96 Wash. 544; McQueen v. People's Store Co., 97 Wash. 387;
Waller v. Southern Ice and Coal Co., 144 Ga. 695, holding uniformly that an
invitation by a chauffeur to ride with him is an act outside the scope of his
authority. A similar view is expressed in Eberle Brewing Co. v. Briscoe
Motor Co., (Mich.) 16o N. W. 44o, though the suit was not by an invitee who
had been injured. A contrary rule was laid down in the jurisdiction of the
principal case in Royal Indemnity Co. v. Platt and Washburn Ref. Co., 163
N. Y. Supp. 197, where an employee whose business was soliciting orders,
using his employer's car for this purpose, invited another to ride with him.
The passenger was injured and was held to be a licensee of the employer.
There was evidence that the employee was soliciting an order from the invited during the trip, but that was not the basis of the decision. The court
cited Grimishaw v. L. S. and M. S. R. Co., 205 N. Y. 366 and Adams v. Tozer,
149 N. Y. Supp. 163, as sustaining its position. The Grimshaw case does not
involve the point in question and is distinguished by the court in the principal case. Plaintiff's intestate, in that case, was in the habit of riding to and
from work on a Wabash engine which was struck by an engine of defendant's road. Defendant was held liable. The status of the injured person
with reference to the Wabash road was immaterial to the question tried
although the court discussed whether he was licensee or trespasser as to
them. In Adams v. Tozer, supra, which is not discussed in the principal case,
and which can be distinguished on its facts, defendant was hired to move
household goods from a car to plaintiff's house. Plaintiff assisted driver, as
was evidently contemplated by the parties, and the driver invited him to ride
in the moving van, which overturned injuring plaintiff. Plaintiff was held
to be a licensee of the owner and was allowed to recover on the ground that
the driver had implied authority to do what was reasonable and necessary
to move the goods, and inviting the plaintiff to ride was not outside that
authority. From this it is apparent that the cases cited in it do not support
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the conclusion in the Royal Indemnity case, and it is believed that that decision was overruled by the principal case, settling the law in New York in
accord with the authorities elsewhere.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CITY MANAGER AN OFrIcER AND NOT AN EMPLoyv -The city of Hot Springs, Arkansas, adopted the provisions of Act
No. 114 of the Acts of 1917, which brought them under the commission form
of city government, and the plaintiff was appointed city manager in accordance with the act. This act in Sec. 33 provides, among other things, that the
city manager need not be a resident of the city at the time of his appointment. In" this action,-which is to determine which one of two appointed
boards of health is the legal one,-it is contended that whole of Act No.
114 is unconstitutional since the state constitution in Art. 19, Sec. 3 provides
that no person shall be elected or appointed to fill an office who does not
possess the qualifications of an elector. One of the qualifications of an elector
is that he shall be a resident. Held, that a city manager is an officer and
comes under the constitutional provision as to qualifications of an officer,
but that the non-residence feature of the act can be stricken out since the
legislature would have passed the act without it. McClendon v. Board of
Health, (Ark., 1919) 216 S. W. 289.
This case involves the much mooted question as to whether a certain
position is a public office or merely an employment. Employment is the
broader term and includes a public office, but all employments are not
public offices. Rickers Petition, 66 N. H. 207, 232; U. S. v. Maurice, 2 Brock.
(U. S.) 96. It has sometimes been laid down as a general rule, that a position is a public office when it is created by law, which duties cast on the incumbent which involve an exercise of some portion of the sovereign power,
and in the performance of which, the public is concerned and which also are
continuing in their nature and not occasional or intermittent. Groves v.
Barden, 169 N. C. 8; U. S. v. Heinze, 177 Fed. 770; (cannot be occasional
service) ; Scully v. U. S., 193 Fed. 185 (must be created by law) ; Ill. Industrial Hone for the Blind v. Dreyer, I5O Ill. App. 574; (position created by
law) ; Blynm v. The City of Pontiac, 185 Mich. 35 (performance of duties a
matter of public concern) ; State Tax Conanission.v. Harrington, 126 Md. 157
(an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign
functions of government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public).
However the courts have ordinarily, in the different cases considered by
them, passed upon the facts of each case and then reached a conclusion
that the necessary elements were or were not present. State Tax Commission
v. Harrington,supra; Fredericks v. Board of Health, 82 N. J. L. 200. In
the principal case the court relied upon Throop v. LangdOn, 40 Mich. 673, 682,
where Judge Cooley said, "the office is distinguished from the employment in
the greater importance, dignity, and independence of the position; in being
required to take an official oath, and perhaps to give an official bond, etc."
This view is to a great extent like the earlier authorities, United States v.
Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385; Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5, although some of the
recent cases have considered the absence or presence of a bond along with
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other circumstances in determining whether a position was an employment or
an office. State Tax Commnnission v. Harrington, supra; Reising v. Portland, 57 Ore. 295; Bankers Surety Co. v. Newport, i62 Ky. 473. In the same
way the duty to take an oath has been considered in some late cases, Blynn
v. Pontiac, supra; but the fact that an employee does take an oath will not
make him an officer. Scully v. U. S., supra; Jones v. Battle Creek, 193 Mich.
i. It might perhaps be urged that the city manager in the principal case was
not an officer, from the foregoing case, since he could be removed at any
time by the commission. However duration of term was held not essential
in Blynn v. Pontiac, supra, although it has been considered with other circumstances in holding a position an employment and not an office. Cross v.
Fisher, 132 Tenn. 31; Bilger v. State, 63 Wash. 457; Jones v. Botkin, 92
People v. Ry. Co., 267 Ill. 142. However the main difficulty is in
Kan. 2;
failing to distinguish between a duration of an office, as such, and the duration of the term of the incumbent. The former seems to be necessary and
the latter not.
RzSTRAINT OF TRAD-SHERMAN ACT-CONTRACTS ArnCTING THZ RESALE
PRIca.-Defendant was a manufacturer of pneumatic tire valves, gauges, etc.
It required all dealers purchasing from it to contract in writing not to resell
below stated prices. On this account it was indicted for engaging in a combination rendered criminal by the Sherman Act. The District Court sustained
a demurrer. Held, demurrer should have been overruled. United States v.
A. Schrader's Sons, Inc., - Sup. Ct. Rep. -.
The court distinguishes this case from United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U. S. 300, on the ground that the Colgate Company was not charged with
making contracts restricting the resale price, but only with refusing to sell
to dealers who would not adhere to the resale prices fixed by the company.
A dictum in Eastern States, etc. Assn. v. United States, 234 U. S. 6oo, accords with the decision of the Colgate case. The decision of the principal
case is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in civil suits, that systematic attempts to control resale or use of a chattel by its owner are invalid,
even though the chattel is made according to a secret process. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Son, 23o U. S. 303, or embodies an invention
protected by patent, Boston Store v. American Gramophone Co., 246 U. S.
8; Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U. S. 490. For a discussion
of these subjects and other cases see 15 MICH. L. RIZv. 58i; i6 MICH. L.
REV. I27-i2. That it is not an infraction of the Sherman Act for a patentee
systematically and by written contracts to restrict the acts of a lessee of
chattels, although such restrictions affect interstate commerce, see, United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32; United States v.
Winslow, 227 U. S. 202.
SALts-TRADING WITH THn ENEMY-ErECT oF WAR UPON CONTRACT
FOR SAZ1 OF GxRmAw WAR BONDS.-Prior to our entrance into the war with

Germany, plaintiff and defendant, both "citizens, or, at least, residents of the
United States," entered into a contract for the purchase and sale of io,ooo
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marks of German War Bonds to be delivered to the plaintiff upon arrival
from Germany,--defendant already having contracted for the purchase of
sufficient bonds from a German bank, to cover the plaintiff's purchase. Although the bonds were not yet issued by the German government, plaintiff
paid the full purchase price for the same. War intervened, and the bonds
never arrived up to the time of this action; some two years later, the plaintiff sues to recover the purchase price, claiming to have rescinded the sale.
Held, a valid executed contract of sale, and title having passed, the-plaintiff
cannot recover,-end even though the contract be executory, the plaintiff
must fail. Erdreich v. Zimmerman et at., (i92o) 179 N. Y. S. 289.
The result reached is correct, provided the court is justified in its fundamental assumption that title had passed, and the contract was executed. But
it is apparent that the court was not warranted in making this- assumption,
because title could not possibly have passed, there being no bonds in existence at the timej of the contract, to which such title could attach,-and title
could not attach to bonds, to be issued thereafter. Deutsch v. Dunham, 72
Ark. I4i; Bates v. Smith, 83 Mich. 347; Andrews v. Newcomb, 32 N. Y. 417,
Maskelinski v. WarsinenSki, 2o N. Y. S. 533. Assuming this to be an executory contract of sale, it seems that the plaintiff should be allowed to recover
his purchase money, on the ground that the declaration of war by the United
States rendered it void and illegal. It has frequently been held that any
exportation to, or importation from, an enemy port is a prima facie trading
with the enemy, and therefore executory contracts involving the same are
dissolved by a declaration of war. M'Grath v. Isaacs, i Nott & M'C. (S. C.)
563; 2 M'C. L. (S.C.) 26; Brown v. Delano, 12 Mass. 37. The English cases
support this doctrine also, but draw a distinction between these cases and
cases where some embargo, or mere temporary restraint is imposed by the
government. In the latter cases, they hold that a mere suspension, and not
a dissolution, of the contracts results,-on the theory that such restraints are
only temporary, whereas no person can forsee the termination of a state of
hostilities, for its duration depends, not upon the will of any one government,
"but on a number of considerations all of which are as uncertain as any such
considerations can be." Andrew Millar and Company v. Taylor and Company, [I916] i K. B. 402; Reid v. Hoskins, (1855) 4 E. & B. 979; Avery v.
Bowden, (i855) 5 E. & B. 714; Esposito v. Bowden, (I855) 4 E. & B. 964.
These cases hold that carrying of goods to or from an enemy port, even in
a neutral vessel, involves prima facie a trading with the enemy. Thus it
appears that the contract in the instant case should be considered as dissolved because these goods, the bonds which were the subject of the executory contract, were to be imported from an enemy port, and therefore a
trading with the enemy was involved. As to intervening impossibility of performance of contracts, as a defense, see L. R. A. 1xi6-F. 71.
STATUTE or LimITATIONs-CouNTERcLAIm GooD ltO D zrfsm PuRposgs
Ov LmiTATIoNS.!-Plaintiff sued on a promissory
note for three hundred, dollars. Defendant filed a counter-claim, ex-delicto,
taHoUGH BARRED BY STATUTE
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for eight hundred dollars on which the statute of limitations had run after
the plaintiff had commenced his action, but before the defendant had filed
his counterclaim. Held: That defendant could not get an affirmative judgment for the difference, but he could use the barred counterclaim as a defense. Huggins v. Smith, (Ark., 1gig) 216 S. W. I.
It is well settled that statutes of limitation do not apply to pure defenses, Louisville Banking Co. v. Buchanan, 117 Ky. 975; Buty v. Goldfinch,
74 Wash. 532; and some courts have held set-offs and counterclaims not to
be barred by the statute, although they would be barred if made the basis of
an affirmative action, Stewart v. Simon, iii Ark. 358; Anltinan and Co. v.
Meade, 121 Ky. 24i ; but other courts have held that the statute applies as
well to a demand attempted to be set-off as to one upon which an action is
brought, Nolin v. Blackwell, 31 N. J. L. 17o; Moore v. Gould, 151 Cal. 723;
Woodland Oil Co. v. Byers, 223 Pa. St. 241. If however, the statute has not
run against the set-off or counterclaim at the time the plaintiff commenced
his action, th6 defendant's cross action will not be barred by the running of
the statute while suit is pending, Brumble v. Brown, 71 N. C. 513; McElwig
v. James, 36 Ohio St. 152. But in Pennsylvania, the time when the running
of the statute is stopped is when defendant files his counterclaim, not when
plaintiff commenced his action, Gilmore v. Reed, 76 Pa. St. 462; McClure v.
McClure, i Grant Cas. 2=. Nor can plaintiff evade the set-off or counterclaim by dismissing his action and later commencing anew, after the statute
has barred the defendant's cross action, Bertschy v. McLeod, 32 Wis. 2o0.
The principal case follows neither of the above rules, but holds that for the

purpose of getting an affirmative judgment, the defendant's cause of action
is barred even though the statutory period elapsed while the suit was pending, but that for the purpose of recoupment, "it existed as long as appellant's
(plaintiff's) cause of action existed." The court apparently reasoned that
since the statute of limitations is inapplicable to defenses (recoupment), and
since by statute, set-off and counterclaim are broader than, but nevertheless,
include, recoupment, hence a counterclaim must be usable either as a counterclaim or as recoupment. as occasion demands. In Utah a statute (ComP.
LAws 19o7, sec. 2971) enacts the law as laid down in the principal case, but
the Arkansas statute would seem not to justify such an interpretation. The
principal case, therefore, appears to be an instance of judicial legislation.
SuPERsTmIous UsEs-BEQuEST FOR MASSES-CHARTS.--A bequest for
the saying of masses held valid; not illegal as a superstitious use.-Bournc
v. Keane, [1919] A. C. 815.
A superstitious use has been defined as "one which has for its object
the propagation of the rites of a religion not tolerated by the law." 4 HAXSBuRY'S LAws oV ENGLAND 120. It is quite evident that in this country there
can be, in law or equity, no such thing within the above definition. See
Methodist Church v. Remington, x Watts (Pa.) 218; Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana
(Ky.) i7o; Holland v. Alcock, io8 N. Y. 312; although such bequests may
be -void for other reasons; viz., because involving a perpetuity, In re Zeag-
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man, 37 Ont. L. Rep. 536; because of lack of definite beneficiaries, Festorazzi
v. St. Joseph's Catholic Church, lO4 Ala. 327; Holland v. Alcock, supra (prior
to Tilden Act). But in England, the law has been settled by a long line of
decisions that a bequest or devise for the saying of masses is void as a gift
to superstitious uses. Adams v. Lambert (1602) 4 Co. Rep. Io4b; West v.
Shuttleworth, (1835) 2 My. & K. 684; Heath v. Chapman, (1856) 2 Drew 417;
In re Blundell's Trust, (I86i) 30 Beav. 36o; In re Fleetwood, (188o) 15 Ch.
D, 594; In re Elliott, (1891) 39 W. R. 297; In re Egan, [1918] 2 Ch. 350.
In the principal case, the question came before the House of Lords for the
first time, and in several elaborate opinions the English cases are reviewed,
the court being of the opinion that the whole doctrine was wrong ab initio, but
that it had been perpetuated because it was considered poor policy to disturb
it after such a long standing. Lord Wrenbury dissented in the principal case
on that ground. The court emphasized the fact that the doctrine of the
prior English decisions was not one of the common law and was not followed in any of the countries which had adopted the common law of England, citing (Ireland) O'Hanlon v. Logue, [19o6] I I. R. 247, 269, 270; (Canada) Elmsley v. Madden, I8 Grant 386; (New Zealand) Carrigan v. Redwood, 3o N. Z. L. R. 244; (Australia) Nelan v. Downes, 23 C. L. R. 546;
(United States) In re Schouler, 134 Mass. 426. The old English doctrine
was originally enunciated on the basis of the preamble to statute i Edw. VI
c. 14, vesting in the crown property appointed to superstitious uses. The instant case, and the recent decision of the House of Lords, In re Bowina,
[1917] A. C. 406, 16 MIcH. L. Rlv. 149 (sustaining a trust to promote atheism), are a gratifying indication of a more tolerant attitude on the part ef
the English judiciary.
TELEGRAPHS-INTERSTATE

CoMmERcE-LIMITATION or LIABILITY ToR NEG-

LIGIENcp-In an action for damages for delayed delivery of an unrepeated

telegram between two points in Kansas, it appearing that the message was
routed to a point in Missouri, which was the regular, usual, and customary
route, and it appearing further that the message passed through its ultimate
destination on its way to the relay point, it was held that this was an interstate transaction, and that a rule of defendant limiting its liability for negligence in delivery was valid. Klippel v. W. U. Telegraph Co., (Kan., 192o)
186 Pac. 993.
In a much cited case it was ruled that a railroad corporation of a state
is liable to taxation by such state upon its receipts for the proportion of the
mileage within the state, for transportation by continuous intrastate carriage, but over a line which passed for a short distance into another state.
Lelfigh Valley R. Co. v. Penna., 145 U. S. 192. Wholly misconceiving what
that case really stood for, some state courts held, in reliance thereon, that,
in the termini of a telegraph line were within one state, a message between
them was intrastate, even though the line passed in part over the territory
of another state. Telegraph Co. v. Reynolds, ioo Va. 459; Railroad Commissioners v. Telegraph Co., 113 N. C. 213 (tariff regulation by state commis-
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sion). But in the leading case of Hanley v. Kansas City So. R. Co., 187 U. S,
617, the supposed doctrine of the Lehigh Valley decision was whittled down
and held to be inapplicable to the fixing of railroad rates. The Virginia
court, however, reaffirmed its previous holding (two judges dissenting) in
Telegraph Co. v. Hughes, 1o4 Va. 24o, decided after the Hanley Case. Thereafter, in" i91o, Congress amended the Interstate Commerce Act of -i887 so as
to place telegraph companies, with respect to interstate business, on the same
footing with other common carriers. This resulted in some of the state
tribunals righting themselves. Telegraph Co. v. Bolling, 12o Va. 413. Others,
however, stood their ground. Telegraph Co. v. Sharp, 121 Ark. 135. In accord with the principal case is Telegraph Co. v. Bowles, (Va., 1919), 98 S.
E. 645. See also Telegraph Co. v. Lee, 174 Ky. 21o, Ann. Cas. i9i8-C, io26
and io36, notes. In Watson v. Telegraph Co., (N. C., i919) ioi S. E. 81,
it was held that a message like that in the case at bar was not interstate,
where the mode of transmission was not the usual and customary one, but
was adopted in order to evade state, laws. While this may be a desirable
result from the public's point of view as well as a curb on fraud, as a matter
of logic it is difficult to see how an intangible mental state can change the
nature of a cold fact. See the reasoning on this point in Telegraph. Co. v.
Mahone, i2o Va. 423. On the whole topic, see the notes in 28 L. R. A. (N.S.)
985 and in L. R. A. i9i8-A 8o5.
TRzsPAsS-ASSAULT

AND

BATTRY-VIOLATION

OF SUNDAY

LAW-ABSO-

LrA iimr.-Plaintiff and defendant were hunting on Sunday in violation
of the law. Defendant accidentally shot the plaintiff. Held: Defendant is liable
in trespass, even in the absence of negligence. White v. Levarn, (Vt., 1920)
LUTe

IO8 Adl. 564.

The fact that plaintiff was violating the Sunday law should not preclude
recovery in an action on the case for negligence because the violation of the
law was not the proximate cause of the injury. Eagan v. Maguire, 21 R. I.
189; Taylor v. Star Coal Co., Iio Ia. 4o; Sutton v. Wauwatosa, 29 Wis. 21.
The breach of the law was a mere condition under which the accident happened, not the cause, Dervin v. Frenier, 91 Vt. 398. It was a mere violation
of the plaintiff's collateral duty to the state. City of Kansas City v. Orr, 62
Kans. 61. See also Coo v. Cumberland County Power Co., 117 Me. 455.
But some courts have held that where plaintiff was violating the law, he
could not recover for injuries due to defendant's negligence. Cratty v. City
of Bangor, 57 Me. 423; Lyons v. Desotelle, 124 Mass. 387; 6 C4NRAr, LAw
JOURNAL, 402; 21 Id. 525; Beachem v. Portsmouth Bridge, 68 N. H. 382. This
hase been changed by statute in Maine and Massachusetts. Where both plaintiff and defendant were violating the Sunday law, it was held that their relative rights were not affected, and that plaintiff could recover in an action
on the case, if defendant were negligent. Gross v. Miller, 93 Ia. 72; Atlantic
Steel Co. v. Hughes, 136 Ga. 5II. See-CooLry oN Tors, [3rd. edit.] p. 273. All
of the above cases were actions on the case where negligence is the gist of
the action, but where plaintiff sues in trespass, as in the principal case, differ-
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ent considerations may arise. The weight of authority holds that one who,
while engaged in a lawful act, accidentally injures the person of another- is
not liable in trespass unless he was negligent. Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75;
Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 69; Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 292.
Contra: Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N. Y. 290; 3 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 324, 328;
Rafferty v. Davis, (1918) 26o Pa. 563. After considerable controversy, the
law of England was settled in accord with the weight of authority in this
country. Stanley v. Powell, (1891) i Q. B. 86; 5 HARv. L. Rev. 36. Where
the defendant's act was unlawful, it is held that he is liable in trespass for
injuries inflicted directly by forces set in motion by him, although he had
no intent to do the specific act which caused the injury, and even in the absence of negligence, Williams v. Townsend, 15 Kans. 563; Murphy v. Wilson,
44 Mo. 33; even though plaintiff acquiesced in defendant's violation of the
law, Evans v. Waite, 83 Wis. 286; and even where it seemed probable that the
plaintiff's own act was the proximate cause of his injury, Horton v. Wylie,
115 Wis. 505. It has been noted above that where both plaintiff and defendant
were engaged in an unlawful act, the plaintiff's right to recover in an action
on the case is usually held to be the same as if neither had been unlawfully
engaged. The right to recover in trespass in such a case has been denied in
Gilmore.v. Fuller, 198 Ill. 13o; Vernon v. Bankston, 28 La. Ann. 710; Aldrich v. Harvey, 5o Vt. 162. But a recovery has been allowed, as in the principal case, even where the plaintiff invited the defendant to enter into the
unlawful engagement, on the theory that consent to an assault and battery is
of no effect. Stout v. Wren, 8 N. C. 42o; Shay v. Thompson, 59 Wis. 540;
Morris v. Miller, 83 Nebr. 218. Contra: Galbraith v. Fleming, 6o Mich. 403.
But this theory is not adhered to in cases holding that a woman can not
recover damages for her own seduction if she consented, regardless of
the unlawfulness of fornication. Paul v. Frazier, 3 Mass. 71; Welsund v.
Schueller, 98 Minn. 475. While it would seem at first blush contrary to
certain general principles of remedial justice to allow a plaintiff to recover
where he and the defendant were in equal fault (and thus was the law stated
Cowp. 341) today the maby Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson, (775)
jority of courts allow a recovery. The apparent anomaly rests on the importance which the law attaches to the safety of life and person.
VENDOR AND PURCHASZR-MORTGAGES-NO CONSTRUCTiVz NoTicE op RxCITAI,S OF UNPYCORDFD DUD.-D held a real property mortgage which was
not recorded. Later, P took a mortgage on same land from the grantee of
D's mortgagor. In said grantee's deed (which was not recorded) was a
recital of the mortgage to D. P sued to foreclose. D claims a priority.
Held: The recitals in the deed gave P no constructive notice, because it was
not recorded. Ebling Brewing Co. v. Gennaro et al, (igig) 179 N. Y. Supp.

384.
In Baker v. Mather, 25 Mich. 5i, it was held that a mortgage took subject to a prior unrecorded mortgage which was expressly referred to in the
deed to the mortgagor of the subsequent mortgage. The principal case held
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contra. Statements by numerous text writers that "a purchaser is affected
with notice of recitals in conveyances forming his chain of title and material
thereto, whether recorded or not" are not well supported by the authorities
cited therefor. I JoNEs, MORTCAGES (7th ed.) sec. 574; 39 Cyc. 1715. The
cases cited are cases where the instrument containing the recital was recorded. See Hancock v. McAvoy, 151 Pa. 439; White v. Foster, io2 Mass.
375. But Baker v. Mather, supra, sustains such a broad statement and possibly Stidham v. Mathews, 29 Ark. 65o. It is clear that the recital of a mortgage in a recorded deed charges that grantee and subsequent mortgagee
under him with notice of such mortgage, although it (the prior mortgage) is
unrecorded. Taylor v. Mitchell, 58 Kans. 194; Sweet v. Henry, 175 N. Y.
268. The ultimate question in the principal case is, therefore, whether or
not a mortgagee or grantee is charged with notice of recitals in unrecorded
instruments in the chain of title. Cases answering in the affirmative thereby
impose upon every purchaser or mortgagee of land the duty of employing a
lawyer or title company to examine the title and if a deed in the chain of title
be missing, require its production. It seems that the principal case is more
in harmony with the true spirit of the recording laws in holding that the
grantee or mortgagee is to be charged with constructive notice of only those
instruments in his chain of title which were on record at the time he took his
deed or mortgage. As suggested by the court in the principal case, the contrary view is reasonable in England where the title deeds are passed on to
each successive grantee and where it is held, as a result, that the grantee
has constructive notice of the contents of all the title deeds in the chain.
Berwick v. Price, [1905] 1 Ch. 632. But under our system of conveyancing,
says the court, the reason for such a rule does not exist.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES-POLLUTION OF-SUIT By NONRIPARIAN USER

-An incorporated city was authorized by law to take water from a stream
for distribution among its inhabitants. One of the customers sued an upstream riparian owner for damages resulting from alleged pollution of the
water. Held, assuming the defendant owed a duty to the city as a lower
riparian owner, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action, as he was not
such an owner nor was there privity of contract between him and defendant,
nor does it appear that the defendant as a riparian owner owed a general
duty to the public. Egyptian Lacquer Mfg. Co. v. Chemical Co. of America,
(N. J., 1919) .o8 Atl. 249.
In Baum v. Somerville Water Co., 84 N. J. Law 61l, 46 L. R. A. (N.S.)
966, it was held the agreement of a water company to furnish water to a
municipality which the latter delivered to the plaintiff did not impose on the
company a duty to the public to furnish water at all times under a sufficient
pressure to extinguish fires. This case is in accord with the weight of authority; however there are a few cases holding that water companies owe a direct
duty to property owners and are liable either in tort or as third party beneficiaries. See Mugge v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1171, 42
So. 8I. Fisher v. Greensboro Water Supply Co., 128 N. C. 375; Guardian
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Trust and Deposit Co. v. Fisher, 200 U. S. 57; 3 MICH. L. Rv. 442; 4 MICH.
L. Rv. 54o; 5 MICH. L. Rzv. 362. Although these cases give the consumer a right of action for failure of the supply against the water
company, as a beneficiary of the contract with the municipality, or
under a general duty to the public undertaken by the water company it is
settled that a purchaser of the water can not bring an action based on the
negligent interference with the water company's water rights. This follows
from the rule that there is no right of action where the duty of another
person to exercise care intervened between the neglect of the defendant and
the injury to the plaintiff. There is ample authority to the effect that a city
or water company authorized by statute to take water from a stream for
municipal uses may maintain an action or bill for interference with the
supply by upstream owners who have not previously acquired the right of
interference by prescription. City of Baltimore v. Warren Mfg. Co., 59 Md.
0
96; City of Springfield v. Fulliner,7 Utah .45 , 27 Pac. 577; Sprague v. Door,
185 Mass. IO; Martin v. Gleason, 139 Mass. 183; Indianapolis Water Co. v.
American Strawboard Co., 53 Fed. 970. In reference to the right to divert
waters to non-riparian lands unaided by statute se 12 MIcH. L. Rv. 304.
VORDED CODiciL. CoNsTRUID.-Under the original
WILLS-AwKWARDLY
will the absolute title to the property would go to the testator's wife. Testator, by codicil, provided that all his property standing in his name should
go to his son, except certain property which came to him through his wife,
which was to go to his wife's estate. Another provision added "this codicil
shall only be deemed valid in event that my wife * * * should die before my
said wife makes a will after my death, otherwise it is to be treated as nugatory and as non-existent." Said wife died before testator. Held, valid, and
son takes such property. In re Werlich's Will, (1920) 179 N. Y. S. 692.

Upon first reading this codicil it seems that it should become valid only
upon one contingency,-namely, if the testator's wife dies, without making a
will, after his death. So, at first glance, it appears the court is going directly
contrary to the express words of the codicil, in holding it is valid if the wife
dies before the testator. It must be admitted that the codicil was very awkwardly constructed, and that the testator's meaning was beclouded. The
case is interesting in showing how far the courts will go to carry out the
real intention of the testator, even to the extent of ignoring certain phrases
and provisions. In effect, this court totally ignored the phrase, "after my
deatl," as much as if it had been omitted by the testator. Upon consideration
of the whole will and the codicil combined, the testator's intention clearly
appears to have been that the property should pass to his son, as he provided
by his codicil, unless his wife made some other testamentary disposition of
it after his death. His wife having preceded him in death, the codicil became
effective according to the testator's intention, and the property passes to his
son. The court is not bound to a literal and strict interpretation of the words
used. McA'urtrie v. McMurtrie, 15 N. J. L. 276. Where the intention of the
testator is manifest from the whole will and surrounding circumstances, but
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the words and modes
trols the language used.
Kan. 464.

of expression are ambigious, the intention conPhillips v. Davies, 92 N. Y. i99; Blair v. Blair, 82

WILS-DEED IN FoRU RESERVING OPERATION UNTIL DxATH op GRANTOR.
-The appellant executed an instrument in the form of a warranty deed, to
his son, in consideration of his verbal promise that he would care for and
support the appellants. The instrument was headed "Warranty Deed" and
"was referred to in the body of the instrument as a "deed," and in the acknowledgement as a "deed" conveying land to the grantee. But in the habendum
clause it was provided "that the deed is inoperative prior to the death of"
the appellants. This suit is in equity to cancel the instrument, the contention of the appellants being that it is a will and not a deed, and therefore revocable. Held, that this instrument was not a will, but a deed, the title to
the land passing through the operation of the granting clause, but the possession was reserved to the grantors (the appellants) during their lives.
Bill dismissed. Sutton et al. v. Sutton, (Ark., i919) 216 S. W. 1052.
Between a deed and a will the following fundamental distinctions are to
be noted: under the former, normally, a present interest passes, under the
latter no interest passes until the death of the testator. The former is a
completed legal act, beyond the power of the grantor to undo, the latter is
ambulatory. 17 MICH. L. RIv. 413. In determining whether an instrument
is a deed or a will the manifest intention of the party making it, as gathered
from all the language used in the writing, is controlling. Jones v. Caird, 153
Wis. 384; Sharp v. Hall, 86 Ala. IIo; Phillips v. Thomas Lumber Co., 94 Ky.
445; Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich. 338; Wall et al. v. Wall, 30 Miss. 9I. Moreover the courts will, where they can reasonably do so, construe an instrument
so as to give it effect, and reject a construction which would deprive it of
any effect. Hunt v. Hunt, i19 Ky. 39; Jones v. Caird, supra; Love v. Blauw,
6r Kan. 496; Wilson v. Carrico, 14o Ind. 533. As would be expected from
the indefinite nature of the above methods of construction, the authorities
are in conflict as to the effect of clauses reserving the operation of such an
instrument,--as in the principal case,--until the death of the maker. Some
cases have held such instruments to be testamentary in character and to be
revocable even: though delivered and in some recorded.
Turner v.
Scott, 51 Pt. St. 126; Bigley v. Souvey, 45 Mich. 370; Hazelton v. Reed, 46
Kan. 73; Murphy v. Gabbert, i66 Mo. 596; Carlton v. Cameron, 54 Tex. 72.
On the other hand many cases have held, as did the court in the principal
case, that a present interest in the land passed immediately through the operation of the granting clause, but the possession and enjoyment were reserved
to the grantors by the reservation clause. Wilson v. Carrico, supra; Prentico
v. Hays, 75 Kan. 76; Hunt v. Hunt, szpra. In still another case while they
held such an instrument a deed, and not a will, the court said that it operated to create an estate in futuro. Abbott v. Holway, 72 Me. 298. And this
conflict is still to e found among the later cases, some holding that such
instruments are wills, Thomas v. Byrd, 112 Miss.: 692; Cox v. Reed, 113 Miss.

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
488; and others holding them to be deeds, which pass a present interest and
reserve thei possession to the grantor for life, Shaull v. Shaull, 182 Ia. 770;
Loveuskoild v. Casas, x96 S. W. 629; and the principal case. The reason for
the conflict seems to lie in the desire of some courts to adhere to common
law rules and strict interpretation, Turner v. Scott, supra, and the cases following it, while other courts lean to a liberal interpretation wherever necessary to uphold the apparent intention of the parties, Wilson v. Carrico, supra,
and the cases following it. Also see 16 MIcH. L. REV. 586; 17 MicH. L. Rxv.
413, and the article by Dean Ballantine, supra.

WILLs-NExT op KiN-Tmn FOR ASc RTAINING CLASs.-The will of the
testator settled the residue of his personal estate on his three daughters, with
cross remainders, and provided that on failure of all these trusts such residue
should be in trust "* * * for such person or persons as on the failure of such
trusts should be his next of kin and entitled to his personal estate under the
statutes for the distribution of the personal estates of intestates." The trusts
failed and it was held that those entitled to take were the next of kin ascertained at the death of the testator. The literal and ordinary meaning of the
words "next of kin" is to be preferred to an artificial meaning derived by
supposing that the testator meant those who would have been his next of
kin if he had died at the time of the failure of the trusts. Carter v. HutchinSon, [IgIg] 2 Ch. 17.
Where the class designated to take under the will is described as those
"then entitled," the time for the ascertainment of the class it at the death
of the testator and not at the time when the gift is to go over. Mortimore v.
Mortimore, L. P- 4 App. Cas. 448; Dove v. Torr, 128 Mass. 38. Essentially
the same problem is presented and the same result reached when different
words of relationship than "next of kin" are used. Holloway v. Holloway,
5 Ves. 399, (heirs-at-law) ; Re Nash, 71 L. T. 5, (nearest relatives) ; Bullock
v. Downes, 9 H. L. Cas. i, (relations). The fact that the heirs or next of kin
are named in the plural and that there is but one person answering that description at the testator's death, does not show that the testator did not intend the class to be ascertained at that time. Ware v. Rowland, 2 Phil. Ch.
635; It re Trusts of Barber's Will, I Sm. & G. 118. The fact that the distribution is to take place on the death of A. does not prevent A's taking as
one of the next of kin. Lee v. Lee, I Dr. & Sm. 85. " * * * It is not sufficient, in order to exclude him, to show the absence of a special intention
to include him; you must show a clear and unambiguous indication of an
intention to exclude him." Id., p. 89. Even where words of survivorship are
part of the description of the class, such as "living at the time of the trusts
failing," or "then living" are held not to refer to the ascertainment of the
class but merely to show which of the class are to take. Brook v. Whitton,
[191o] I Ch. 278; Re Nash, su/pr
But see, contra, Tiffinr v. Longman, 15
Beav. 275; Eagles v. Le Breton, L. R. 15 Eq. 148. The decision in the latter
case, however, was perhaps incorrectly reported. Note, 71 L. T. 7. If the
clear intent of the testator is to fix the time of ascertainmerit of the class at
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some time other than his own death, such intent will be given effect. Welch
v. Brimnmer, i6g Mass. 294; inkhmn, v. Blair, 57 N. H. 226. But it was
suggested by Lord Langdale in Seifferth v. Badham, 9 Beav. 370, 374, that a
real intent very rarely exists in such cases. He said: "* * * it is perhaps
probable that the testator, in such cases, means only to provide for those
whom he does mean to benefit in the way he thinks best, and then to add,
that if events defeat that particular intention the law may take its course."
The same idea was admirably expressed by Holmes, J., in Whall v. Converse,
146 Mass. 345, 348. "* * * such a mode of ascertaining the beneficiary implies that the testator has exhausted his specific wishes by the previous limitations, and is content thereafter to let the law take its course."

